Values and evidence: how models make a difference

Parker, Wendy S.; Winsberg, Eric

Abstract

We call attention to an underappreciated way in which non-epistemic values influence evidence evaluation in science. Our argument draws upon some well-known features of scientific modeling. We show that, when scientific models stand in for background knowledge in Bayesian and other probabilistic methods for evidence evaluation, conclusions can be influenced by the non-epistemic values that shaped the setting of priorities in model development. Moreover, it is often infeasible to correct for this influence. We further suggest that, while this value influence is not particularly prone to the problem of wishful thinking, it could have problematic non-epistemic consequences in some cases.

Citation

Parker, W. S., & Winsberg, E. (2018). Values and evidence: how models make a difference. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 8(1), 125-142. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-017-0180-6

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jun 14, 2017
• Online Publication Date: Jul 17, 2017
• Publication Date: Jan 1, 2018
• Deposit Date: Jul 19, 2017
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 19, 2017
• Journal: European Journal for Philosophy of Science
• Print ISSN: 1879-4912
• Electronic ISSN: 1879-4920
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 8
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 125-142
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-017-0180-6
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1354493