Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo

Faraci, David; Shoemaker, David

Abstract

Susan Wolf objects to the Real Self View (RSV) of moral responsibility that it is insufficient, that even if one’s actions are expressions of one’s deepest or “real” self, one might still not be morally responsible for one’s actions. As a counterexample to the RSV, Wolf offers the case of JoJo, the son of a dictator, who endorses his father’s (evil) values, but who is insane and is thus not responsible for his actions. Wolf’s data for this conclusion derives from what she takes to be our “pretheoretic intuitions” about JoJo. As it turns out, though, experimental data on actual pretheoretic intuitions does not seem to support Wolf’s claim. In this paper, we present such data and argue that, at least with respect to this particular objection, the RSV can survive Wolf’s attack intact.

Citation

Faraci, D., & Shoemaker, D. (2010). Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(3), 319-332. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Mar 19, 2010
• Publication Date: Mar 19, 2010
• Deposit Date: Aug 31, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Sep 4, 2018
• Journal: Review of Philosophy and Psychology
• Print ISSN: 1878-5158
• Electronic ISSN: 1878-5166
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 1
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 319-332
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1350360
• Related Public URLs: https://davidfaraci.com/pubs/jojo.pdf