We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes

Faraci, David

Abstract

Barry Maguire argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. ‘There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to’ this thesis, he claims. In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. I first examine Maguire's purported differences between reasons for action and so-called reasons for affective attitudes. In each case, I argue that the differences are exaggerated and that to the extent they obtain, they are best explained by differences between actions and affective attitudes, not between kinds of normative support. In closing, I argue that even if Maguire were correct, the extent of the threat to one of his central targets—so-called ‘buck-passing’ views—would remain unclear.

Citation

Faraci, D. (2020). We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes. Mind, 129(513), 225-234. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy054

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Oct 25, 2018
• Publication Date: Jan 31, 2020
• Deposit Date: Nov 13, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Oct 25, 2020
• Journal: Mind
• Print ISSN: 0026-4423
• Electronic ISSN: 1460-2113
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 129
• Issue: 513
• Pages: 225-234
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy054
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1343297