On the efficiency of the first price auction

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio

Abstract

We provide a natural setting in privatizations in which the equilibrium of the first price auction gives greater expected surplus than any equilibrium of the open ascending auction.

Citation

Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Michelucci, F. (2017). On the efficiency of the first price auction. Economics Letters, 156, 159-161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 5, 2017
• Online Publication Date: May 15, 2017
• Publication Date: Jul 1, 2017
• Deposit Date: Jun 15, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Nov 15, 2018
• Journal: Economics Letters
• Print ISSN: 0165-1765
• Electronic ISSN: 1873-7374
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 156
• Pages: 159-161
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1328880