Professor Angel Hernando-Veciana angel.hernando-veciana@durham.ac.uk
Visiting Professor
On the efficiency of the first price auction
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio
Authors
Fabio Michelucci
Abstract
We provide a natural setting in privatizations in which the equilibrium of the first price auction gives greater expected surplus than any equilibrium of the open ascending auction.
Citation
Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Michelucci, F. (2017). On the efficiency of the first price auction. Economics Letters, 156, 159-161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | May 5, 2017 |
Online Publication Date | May 15, 2017 |
Publication Date | Jul 1, 2017 |
Deposit Date | Jun 15, 2018 |
Publicly Available Date | Nov 15, 2018 |
Journal | Economics Letters |
Print ISSN | 0165-1765 |
Electronic ISSN | 1873-7374 |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 156 |
Pages | 159-161 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1328880 |
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Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Copyright Statement
© 2017 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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