The insider's curse

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Tröge, Michael

Abstract

The paper shows that in an open-ascending bid auction with multi-dimensional uncertainty about private and common value components, private information about the common value has negative value for a bidder if there are sufficiently many bidders. We discuss the role of the visibility of bids and the multi-dimensionality of private information for this result.

Citation

Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Tröge, M. (2011). The insider's curse. Games and Economic Behavior, 71(2), 339-350. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.007

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: May 24, 2010
• Publication Date: 2011-03
• Deposit Date: Jun 15, 2018
• Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
• Print ISSN: 0899-8256
• Electronic ISSN: 1090-2473
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 71
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 339-350
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.007
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1328845