Professor Angel Hernando-Veciana angel.hernando-veciana@durham.ac.uk
Visiting Professor
Second best efficiency and the English auction
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio
Authors
Fabio Michelucci
Abstract
We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the biddersʼ incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskinʼs (1992) result that any first best allocation that is deterministic and monotone can be implemented with the English auction carries over to the second best.
Citation
Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Michelucci, F. (2011). Second best efficiency and the English auction. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 496-506. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Online Publication Date | Apr 21, 2011 |
Publication Date | Nov 1, 2011 |
Deposit Date | Jun 15, 2018 |
Publicly Available Date | Jun 28, 2018 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Print ISSN | 0899-8256 |
Electronic ISSN | 1090-2473 |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 73 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 496-506 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1324087 |
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Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Copyright Statement
© 2011 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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