Metaphysical Realism and Anti-realism

Miller, J.T.M.

Abstract

Minimally, metaphysical realists hold that there exist some mind-independent entities. Metaphysical realists also (tend) to hold that we can speak meaningfully or truthfully about mind-independent entities. Those that reject metaphysical realism deny one or more of these commitments. This Element aims to introduce the reader to the core commitments of metaphysical realism, and to illustrate how these commitments have changed over time by surveying some of the main families of views that realism has been contrasted with: (radical) scepticism, idealism, and anti-realism.

Citation

Miller, J. (2022). Metaphysical Realism and Anti-realism. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009006927

• Book Type: Authored Book
• Publication Date: 2022
• Deposit Date: Apr 26, 2022
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Series Title: Elements in Metaphysics
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009006927
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1120247
• Publisher URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/abs/metaphysical-realism-and-antirealism/F508D4A91B075AAB6328818DE6A3FCC1
• Contract Date: Mar 14, 2022