Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Analysis?

Miller, J.T.M.

Abstract

Amie Thomasson’s work provides numerous ways to rethink and improve our approach to metaphysics. This chapter is my attempt to begin to sketch why I still think the easy approach leaves room for substantive metaphysical work, and why I do not think that metaphysics need rely on any ‘epistemically metaphysical’ knowledge. After distinguishing two possible forms of deflationism, I argue that the easy ontologist needs to accept (implicitly or explicitly) that there are worldly constraints on what sorts of entities could exist, and could co-exist. I argue this leaves room for a substantive role for metaphysics if (following the work of E.J. Lowe) we take metaphysics to be concerned with the possible ways that reality could be. I explain how this conception does not need to appeal to any ‘epistemically metaphysical’ knowledge, and need only make use of conceptual and/or empirical means to arrive at views on what could exist (and co-exist). Thus, the answer I propose to the question posed in the title, at least in my view, is no-one. Or, at least, no-one should be afraid of conceptual analysis. Not even metaphysicians.

Citation

Miller, J. (2023). Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Analysis?. In M. Garcia-Godinez (Ed.), Thomasson on Ontology (85-108). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23672-3_5

• Online Publication Date: Jun 11, 2023
• Publication Date: 2023
• Deposit Date: May 2, 2023
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 12, 2025
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Pages: 85-108
• Series Title: Philosophers in Depth (PID)
• Book Title: Thomasson on Ontology
• ISBN: 9783031236716
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23672-3_5
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1619137
• Contract Date: Apr 19, 2023