Reward schemes (2017)
Journal Article
Lagziel, D., & Lehrer, E. (2018). Reward schemes. Games and Economic Behavior, 107, 21-40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.019

An investor has some funds invested through portfolio managers. By the end of the year, she reallocates the funds among these managers according to the managers' performance. While the investor tries to maximize her subjective utility (that depends o... Read More about Reward schemes.

Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game (2017)
Journal Article
Chowdhury, S., Jeon, J., & Saha, B. (2017). Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game. Southern Economic Journal, 84(2), 474-483. https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12223

We run between-subject dictator games with exogenously specified “give” or “take” frames involving a balanced pool of male and female dictators and constant payoff possibilities. We find the following: Females allocate more under the taking frame tha... Read More about Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game.

Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market (2017)
Journal Article
Bag, P., & Saha, B. (2017). Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market. The Economic Journal, 127(601), 624-652. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12483

Illegal betting in a two-team sports contest is studied with player sabotage instigated by a monopolist bookmaker. Whereas punters hold beliefs about the teams’ winning chances correlated with Nature's draw, the bookmaker's information is noise-free.... Read More about Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market.

On the efficiency of the first price auction (2017)
Journal Article
Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Michelucci, F. (2017). On the efficiency of the first price auction. Economics Letters, 156, 159-161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003

We provide a natural setting in privatizations in which the equilibrium of the first price auction gives greater expected surplus than any equilibrium of the open ascending auction.