Auctions (2018)
Book Chapter
Hernando-Veciana, A. (2018). Auctions. In L. Corchon, & M. Marini (Eds.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II (318-337). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112789.00020

Inefficient Rushes in Auctions (2018)
Journal Article
Hernando-Veciana, A., & Michelucci, F. (2018). Inefficient Rushes in Auctions. Theoretical Economics, 13(1), 273-306. https://doi.org/10.3982/te2513

We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it... Read More about Inefficient Rushes in Auctions.