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Outputs (58)

Eye-image as Nonverbal Social Cue has Asymmetric Gender Effects in Dictator Taking Games (2023)
Journal Article
Chowdhury, S. M., Young Jeon, J., & Saha, B. (2023). Eye-image as Nonverbal Social Cue has Asymmetric Gender Effects in Dictator Taking Games. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102087

Dictator giving games often demonstrate that nonverbal social cues, such as drawn-in eyes on display, induce pro-social behavior in the form of giving more. Notably, sometimes this effect is seen to differ between males and females. However, the effe... Read More about Eye-image as Nonverbal Social Cue has Asymmetric Gender Effects in Dictator Taking Games.

Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining and Innovation (2023)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., & Saha, B. (in press). Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining and Innovation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,

A firm undertakes workers’ productivity improving R&D before negotiating wage with the union, where negotiation can take place between their incentivised delegates. Under bilateral delegation profit, R&D and productivity-wage gap all increase, whilst... Read More about Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining and Innovation.

Prejudice, Bias and Identity Neutral Policy (2020)
Journal Article
Bag, P. K., Saha, B., & Sikdar, S. (2021). Prejudice, Bias and Identity Neutral Policy. Social Choice and Welfare, 56(1), 173-203. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01275-x

How does identity blind hiring, as opposed to sighted hiring, influence matching between high ability candidates and high value jobs? Job seekers might face constraints in signaling their abilities for lack of wealth and being denied education. Addin... Read More about Prejudice, Bias and Identity Neutral Policy.

Household Self-Employment Eliminates Child Labour (2019)
Book Chapter
Saha, B. (2019). Household Self-Employment Eliminates Child Labour. In S. Bandyopadhya, & M. Dutta (Eds.), Opportunities and challenges in development : essays for Sarmila Banerjee (357-366). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9981-7

This paper shows that if a minimal proportion of poor households is empowered with self-employment opportunities, child labour will not arise in equilibrium. The economy will have a unique `good' equilib- rium generating a suciently high wage to supp... Read More about Household Self-Employment Eliminates Child Labour.

Credit Where Credit's Due: The Enabling Effects of Empowerment in Indian Microfinance (2019)
Journal Article
Saha, B., & Sangwan, N. (2019). Credit Where Credit's Due: The Enabling Effects of Empowerment in Indian Microfinance. World Development, 122, 537-551. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.06.009

We utilise primary data collected from a North Indian village in 2015 to 2016 and examine the impact of women’s empowerment on their creditworthiness measured by the total annual loan amounts. Our key explanatory variable – an empowerment index – has... Read More about Credit Where Credit's Due: The Enabling Effects of Empowerment in Indian Microfinance.

Goal Setting as a Motivator for Student Performance: Evidence from Lab Experiments (2019)
Journal Article
Saha, B., & Roy, S. (2019). Goal Setting as a Motivator for Student Performance: Evidence from Lab Experiments. Journal of Higher Education Theory and Practice, 19(3), 153-165

Can goal-setting motivate college-level students to improve their performance? We report the results of a two-stage study designed to test the effects of performance-based versus action-based goals. We find that performance-based goals are not signif... Read More about Goal Setting as a Motivator for Student Performance: Evidence from Lab Experiments.

Failing to Learn: India's Schools and Teachers (2018)
Book Chapter
Saha, B., & Saha, S. (2018). Failing to Learn: India's Schools and Teachers. In R. Prasad, C. Rowley, & A. Banerjee (Eds.), Changing the Indian economy : renewal, reform and revival (55-75). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-08-102005-0.00004-6

India has made substantial progress in expanding schooling facilities and is now poised to achieve universal primary education; however, children’s learning is not improving. Two major national assessment surveys showed that the numeracy and literacy... Read More about Failing to Learn: India's Schools and Teachers.

Enhancing Excellence: Socially Motivated Private Schools of Nepal (2018)
Journal Article
Pal, S., & Saha, B. (2019). Enhancing Excellence: Socially Motivated Private Schools of Nepal. The Journal of Development Studies, 55(5), 765-785. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2018.1464142

Social motivation can promote efficiency of public service delivery though its role in providing schooling is little understood. We provide both theoretical and empirical insights as to why not-for-profit private schools could enhance excellence in s... Read More about Enhancing Excellence: Socially Motivated Private Schools of Nepal.

Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game (2017)
Journal Article
Chowdhury, S., Jeon, J., & Saha, B. (2017). Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game. Southern Economic Journal, 84(2), 474-483. https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12223

We run between-subject dictator games with exogenously specified “give” or “take” frames involving a balanced pool of male and female dictators and constant payoff possibilities. We find the following: Females allocate more under the taking frame tha... Read More about Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game.

Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market (2017)
Journal Article
Bag, P., & Saha, B. (2017). Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market. The Economic Journal, 127(601), 624-652. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12483

Illegal betting in a two-team sports contest is studied with player sabotage instigated by a monopolist bookmaker. Whereas punters hold beliefs about the teams’ winning chances correlated with Nature's draw, the bookmaker's information is noise-free.... Read More about Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market.

Bilateral delegation in duopoly wage and employment bargaining (2016)
Journal Article
Chatterjee, I., & Saha, B. (2017). Bilateral delegation in duopoly wage and employment bargaining. Managerial and Decision Economics, 38(4), 607-621. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2807

We study bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining between firms and unions in a Cournot duopoly. Incentive delegation creates frictions for each party between its objectives of within-firm rent extraction and market/job stealing from th... Read More about Bilateral delegation in duopoly wage and employment bargaining.

Match-Fixing in a Monopoly Betting Market (2016)
Journal Article
Bag, P., & Saha, B. (2016). Match-Fixing in a Monopoly Betting Market. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 26(1), 257-289. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12172

A monopolist bookmaker may set betting odds on a fairly even contest to induce match-fixing by an influential corrupt punter. His loss to the corrupt punter is more than made up for by enticing enough ordinary punters to bet on the losing team. This... Read More about Match-Fixing in a Monopoly Betting Market.

Entry Threats and Inefficiency in `Efficient Bargaining' (2015)
Journal Article
Pal, R., & Saha, B. (2016). Entry Threats and Inefficiency in `Efficient Bargaining'. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 63(3), 258-277. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12091

We study limit pricing in a model of entry with asymmetric information, where the incumbent firm's wage is endogenously determined through ‘efficient bargaining’ with its union. In the presence of entry threat, the incumbent firm-union pair may face... Read More about Entry Threats and Inefficiency in `Efficient Bargaining'.

Privatization, underpricing and welfare in the presence of foreign competition (2015)
Journal Article
Ghosh, A., Mitra, M., & Saha, B. (2015). Privatization, underpricing and welfare in the presence of foreign competition. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 17(3), 433-460. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12095

We analyze privatization in a differentiated oligopoly setting with a domestic public firm and foreign profit-maximizing firms. In particular, we examine pricing below marginal cost by public firm, the optimal degree of privatization and, the relatio... Read More about Privatization, underpricing and welfare in the presence of foreign competition.

From rigidity to flexibility (2015)
Book Chapter
Saha, B. (2015). From rigidity to flexibility. In K. Ramaswamy (Ed.), Labour, employment and economic growth in India (221-238). Cambridge University Press

Pollution Tax, Partial Privatization and Environment (2015)
Journal Article
Pal, R., & Saha, B. (2015). Pollution Tax, Partial Privatization and Environment. Resource and Energy Economics, 40, 19-35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2015.01.004

Considering a differentiated mixed duopoly we show that when privatization and pollution tax are used together environmental damage will be non-monotone in the level of privatization, and optimal privatization is always partial privatization. Whether... Read More about Pollution Tax, Partial Privatization and Environment.

Labour markets: Balancing freedom and protection (2014)
Book Chapter
Saha, B., & Pal, R. (2014). Labour markets: Balancing freedom and protection. In A. Goyal (Ed.), Handbook of the Indian economy in the 21st century : understanding the inherent dynamism. Oxford University Press

Institutions or geography: Which matters most in economic development? (2013)
Journal Article
Saha, B. (2013). Institutions or geography: Which matters most in economic development?. Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 25(1-2), 69-89. https://doi.org/10.1177/0260107914524668

Although development economics generally confines its attention to the last 60 years, there is a growing body of research that looks back centuries and tries to determine if the events in the long past are responsible for underdevelopment of today’s... Read More about Institutions or geography: Which matters most in economic development?.

Trade openness, labour institutions and flexibilisation: Theory and evidence from India. (2013)
Journal Article
Saha, B., Sen, K., & Maiti, D. (2013). Trade openness, labour institutions and flexibilisation: Theory and evidence from India. Labour Economics, 24, 180-195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2013.08.008

There is a global trend of substituting permanent workers by workers on fixed term contracts, job outsourcing and production subcontracting. Labour institutions and globalisation are often taken to be causally related to this phenomenon, but the evid... Read More about Trade openness, labour institutions and flexibilisation: Theory and evidence from India..

Mixed duopoly and environment. (2013)
Journal Article
Saha, B., & Pal, R. (2014). Mixed duopoly and environment. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 16(1), 96-118. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12056

We show under general demand and cost conditions that in a mixed duopoly with pollution the government can implement the socially optimal outputs and abatements by a tax-subsidy scheme and keeping the public firm fully public. The scheme requires tax... Read More about Mixed duopoly and environment..

Bilateral Delegation in Wage and Employment Bargaining in Monopoly (2013)
Journal Article
Chatterjee, I., & Saha, B. (2013). Bilateral Delegation in Wage and Employment Bargaining in Monopoly. Economics Letters, 120(2), 280-283. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.009

We study efficiency and distributional implications of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly. Delegation causes underproduction, and the bargaining pie severely contracts rendering mutual gains from delegation impossible.... Read More about Bilateral Delegation in Wage and Employment Bargaining in Monopoly.

State ownership, credit risk and bank competition: a mixed oligopoly approach. (2013)
Journal Article
Saha, B., & Sensarma, R. (2013). State ownership, credit risk and bank competition: a mixed oligopoly approach. Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies, 6(1), 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1080/17520843.2011.641719

The recent financial crisis led many governments to buy equity in banks leading to situations of mixed oligopoly in banking markets. We model such a case where a partially state-owned bank competes with a private bank in collecting deposits. The gove... Read More about State ownership, credit risk and bank competition: a mixed oligopoly approach..

Does privatization improve the environment? Revisiting the monopoly case. (2012)
Journal Article
Saha, B. (2012). Does privatization improve the environment? Revisiting the monopoly case. Economics Letters, 115(1), 97-99. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.017

This note shows that the argument of Beladi and Chao (2006) [Beladi, H., Chao, C., 2006. Does privatization improve the environment? Economics Letters 93, 343–347] that privatization can harm the environment by inducing lower pollution tax is incorre... Read More about Does privatization improve the environment? Revisiting the monopoly case..

Match-Fixing under Competitive Odds. (2011)
Journal Article
Saha, B., & Kanti Bag, P. (2011). Match-Fixing under Competitive Odds. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 318-344. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.001

Two bookmakers compete in Bertrand fashion while setting odds on the outcomes of a sporting contest where an influential punter (or betting syndicate) may bribe some player(s) to fix the contest. Zero profit and bribe prevention may not always hold t... Read More about Match-Fixing under Competitive Odds..

Academic specialization and returns to education: Evidence from India. (2011)
Journal Article
Saha, B., & Sensarma, R. (2011). Academic specialization and returns to education: Evidence from India. Journal of Education and Work, 24(5), 501-520. https://doi.org/10.1080/13639080.2011.573775

We study returns to academic specialisation for Indian corporate sector workers by analysing cross-sectional data on male employees randomly selected from six large firms. Our analysis shows that going to college pays off, as it brings significant in... Read More about Academic specialization and returns to education: Evidence from India..

Mixed Ownership, Managerial Incentives and Bank Competition. (2011)
Journal Article
Saha, B., & Sensarma, R. (2011). Mixed Ownership, Managerial Incentives and Bank Competition. Bulletin of Economic Research, 63(4), 385-403. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00354.x

We consider deposit competition between two banks, where prior to competition one bank is subjected to a nationalization decision and the other bank chooses managerial incentives. The government who maximizes a modified form of social welfare (with g... Read More about Mixed Ownership, Managerial Incentives and Bank Competition..

Interest rate discrimination, tenancy and cost sharing. (2011)
Journal Article
Saha, B., & Sharma, T. (2011). Interest rate discrimination, tenancy and cost sharing. Indian Growth and Development Review, 4(2), 153-165. https://doi.org/10.1108/17538251111172050

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to develop a theory of sharecropping with cost sharing after allowing for an explicit role of a creditor. In the tenancy literature, the prevalence of sharecropping has remained an important issue. While most contri... Read More about Interest rate discrimination, tenancy and cost sharing..

Labour institutions in India and China: A tale of two nations. (2006)
Journal Article
Saha, B. (2006). Labour institutions in India and China: A tale of two nations. Journal of South Asian Development, 1(2), 179-205. https://doi.org/10.1177/097317410600100202

This essay makes a comparative assessment of labour institutions of China and India. China's drastic labour reforms were to some extent necessary for the creation of a free labour market, which then allowed unfettered industrial growth and rapid empl... Read More about Labour institutions in India and China: A tale of two nations..

Extractive bribe and default in subsidized credit programs. (2006)
Journal Article
Saha, B., & Thampy, T. (2006). Extractive bribe and default in subsidized credit programs. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60(2), 182-204. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.05.004

We present a dynamic model of subsidized credit provision to examine how asymmetric information exacerbates inefficiency caused by corruption. If a borrower and a corrupt official interact with symmetric information, credit terms can be so designed t... Read More about Extractive bribe and default in subsidized credit programs..

Divestment and bank competition. (2004)
Journal Article
Saha, B., & Sensarma, R. (2004). Divestment and bank competition. Journal of Economics, 81(3), 223-247

Clean development mechanism: issues and options. (2003)
Book Chapter
Saha, B., Babu, P., & Kavi Kumar, K. (2003). Clean development mechanism: issues and options. In M. Toman, U. Chakravorty, & S. Gupta (Eds.), India and Global Climate Change Perspectives on Economics and Policy from a Developing Country, Resources for the Future Press, Resources for the Future. Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, also Oxford University Press, 2004, New Delhi

Strike threats and wage settlements. (2000)
Book Chapter
Saha, B., & Ghosh, S. (2000). Strike threats and wage settlements. In G. Gupta, M. Gupta, & B. Moitra (Eds.), Issues in Development Economics, Orient Longman, Hyderabad (20-36)

Severance pay, wage effects and entry deterrence. (2000)
Book Chapter
Saha, B. (2000). Severance pay, wage effects and entry deterrence. In G. Gupta, M. Gupta, & B. Moitra (Eds.), Issues in Development Economics, Orient Longman, Hyderabad (1-19)

Human Capital, Employment and Worker Well-being in India. (2000)
Book Chapter
Saha, B., & Jayati, S. (2000). Human Capital, Employment and Worker Well-being in India. In S. Gangopadhyay, & W. Wadhwa (Eds.), Economic Reforms for the Poor’ (197-232). (Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies and Society for Economic research and Financial Analysis.). Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi

Joint implementation: A bargaining approach. (1997)
Book Chapter
Saha, B., & Babu, P. (1997). Joint implementation: A bargaining approach. In J. Parikh, R. Culpeper, D. Runnalls, & J. Painuly (Eds.), Climate change and North-South Cooperation: Indo-Canadian Cooperation in Joint Implementation (232-255). Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Limited, New Delhi

Layoff compensation and entry deterrence. (1996)
Book Chapter
Saha, B., & Sen, A. (1996). Layoff compensation and entry deterrence. In A. Sen, A. Banerjee, & B. Chatterjee (Eds.), Economic Theory, Trade and Quantitative Economics (108-122). University of Calcutta

Forming or reforming the exit policy. (1995)
Book Chapter
Saha, B. (1995). Forming or reforming the exit policy. In K. Parikh (Ed.), The mid-year review of the economy, 1994-95 (200-222). India International Centre and Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi

Exit policy: problems and options. (1992)
Book Chapter
Saha, B. (1992). Exit policy: problems and options. In Indian Merchants' Chamber and Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (91-108)