All Outputs (2)

Participation and Welfare in Auctions with Default (2019)
Journal Article
Lee, J., & Li, D. (2019). Participation and Welfare in Auctions with Default. Economics Letters, 183, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108620

In an auction with costly participation, we show that bidder default may cause social welfare loss through (i) the possibility of no trade and (ii) the under participation of bidders in equilibrium. We also provide closed-form solutions to the model.

Equilibrium Competition, Social Welfare and Corruption in Procurement Auctions (2019)
Journal Article
Li, D. Z., & Minbo, X. (2019). Equilibrium Competition, Social Welfare and Corruption in Procurement Auctions. Social Choice and Welfare, 53(3), 443-465. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01192-8

We study the effects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare in a public procurement auction. A government pays costs to invite firms to the auction, and a bureaucrat who runs the auction may request a bribe from the winning firm.... Read More about Equilibrium Competition, Social Welfare and Corruption in Procurement Auctions.