The replication crisis is less of a “crisis” in Lakatos’ philosophy of science than it is in Popper’s

Rubin, Mark

Abstract

Popper’s (1983, 2002) philosophy of science has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the wake of the replication crisis, offering a philosophical basis for the ensuing science reform movement. However, adherence to Popper’s approach may also be at least partly responsible for the sense of “crisis” that has developed following multiple unexpected replication failures. In this article, I contrast Popper’s approach with that of Lakatos (1978) as well as with a related but problematic approach called naïve methodological falsificationism (NMF; Lakatos, 1978). The Popperian approach is powerful because it is based on logical refutations, but its theories are noncausal and, therefore, potentially lacking in scientific value. In contrast, the Lakatosian approach considers causal theories, but it concedes that these theories are not logically refutable. Finally, NMF represents a hybrid approach that subjects Lakatosian causal theories to Popperian logical refutations. However, its tactic of temporarily accepting a ceteris paribus clause during theory testing may be viewed as scientifically inappropriate, epistemically inconsistent, and “completely redundant” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 40). I conclude that the replication “crisis” makes the most sense in the context of the Popperian and NMF approaches because it is only in these two approaches that the failure to replicate a previously corroborated theory represents a logical refutation of that theory. In contrast, such replication failures are less problematic in the Lakatosian approach because they do not logically refute theories. Indeed, in the Lakatosian approach, replication failures can be temporarily ignored or used to motivate theory development.

Citation

Rubin, M. (2025). The replication crisis is less of a “crisis” in Lakatos’ philosophy of science than it is in Popper’s. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 15(1), Article 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00629-x

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Dec 12, 2024
• Online Publication Date: Jan 9, 2025
• Publication Date: Mar 1, 2025
• Deposit Date: Jan 16, 2025
• Publicly Available Date: Jan 16, 2025
• Journal: European Journal for Philosophy of Science
• Print ISSN: 1879-4912
• Electronic ISSN: 1879-4920
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 15
• Issue: 1
• Article Number: 5
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00629-x
• Keywords: Lakatos, Theory testing, Metascience, Popper, Philosophy of science, Replication crisis
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/3332076