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Poverty, Stereotypes and Politics: Counting the Epistemic Costs

Puddifoot, Katherine

Authors



Contributors

Leonie Smith
Editor

Alfred Archer
Editor

Abstract

Epistemic analyses of stereotyping describe how they lead to misperceptions and misunderstandings of social actors and events. The analyses have tended so far to focus on how people acquire stereotypes and/or how the stereotypes lead to distorted perceptions of the evidence that is available about individuals. In this chapter, I focus instead on how the stereotypes can generate misleading evidence by influencing the policy preferences of people who harbour the biases. My case study is stereotypes that relate to people living in poverty. I show how these stereotypes influence policy choices in ways that generate misleading evidence about people living in poverty. I argue that the stereotypes generate the misleading evidence by supporting policies that restrict the agency of the people in poverty. In generating this misleading evidence, the stereotypes place additional constraints on the epistemic agency of everyone, making it harder for anyone, including those who do and those who do not endorse the stereotypes, to gain true beliefs about people living in poverty. Going forward, I conclude, adequate epistemic analyses of stereotyping ought to be more expansive, acknowledging both the way that stereotypes generate misleading evidence by constraining the agency of those stereotyped, and how we can all thereby be epistemically constrained by the stereotypes harboured by others.

Citation

Puddifoot, K. (in press). Poverty, Stereotypes and Politics: Counting the Epistemic Costs. In L. Smith, & A. Archer (Eds.), The Moral Psychology of Poverty. Springer Nature

Deposit Date Oct 16, 2024
Publisher Springer Nature
Book Title The Moral Psychology of Poverty
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2959722
Publisher URL https://www.springernature.com/gp

This file is under embargo due to copyright reasons.




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