Cosmopsychism and the Laws of Physics: A Hylomorphic Perspective

Simpson, William

Abstract

I outline a hylomorphic account of physical reality in which the cosmos as a whole has mental properties which explain its nomological order. According to this theory, the cosmos is directed in its temporal development toward certain ends or goals which it intends, and these ends are immanent to the cosmos rather than being imposed upon it. My object in doing so is to argue that, contrary to Sean Carroll (2021), a view of physical reality as having intrinsically mental aspects need not induce any modifications of the known laws of physics nor violate ‘causal closure’ under physical laws. Rather, this soft form of naturalism, which includes final causes within nature, provides a foundation for the laws of physics that is lacking in Carroll’s hard form of naturalism, which excludes mind from fundamental reality. I propose a trilemma for Carroll in which he should either: abandon naturalism, by admitting that the laws of physics are imposed by a divine mind; abandon realism, by conceding that ‘laws’ are constructed by human minds; or embrace cosmopsychism, by acknowledging that the cosmos as a whole instantiates a mind. I argue that cosmic hylomorphism, which links consciousness with intentional cognition, is preferable to non-hylomorphic versions of cosmo- psychism, which tend to prioritize consciousness over intentionality.

Citation

Simpson, W. (2024). Cosmopsychism and the Laws of Physics: A Hylomorphic Perspective. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 31(9-10), 132-157. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.9.132

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Aug 31, 2024
• Online Publication Date: Oct 1, 2024
• Publication Date: 2024-10
• Deposit Date: Sep 22, 2024
• Publicly Available Date: Nov 18, 2024
• Journal: Journal of Consciousness Studies
• Print ISSN: 1355-8250
• Publisher: Imprint Academic
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 31
• Issue: 9-10
• Pages: 132-157
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.9.132
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2873624