Institutional 'gaming' involving staff turnover during recent research evaluation exercises by UK Russell Group universities

Harris, Richard; Mate-Sanchez-Val, Mariluz; Marín, Manuel Ruiz

Abstract

There is limited evidence on the extent to which UK universities institutionally 'game' the system with respect to periodic research assessment exercises (i.e. RAE/REF), i.e., the hiring (and leaving) of staff before the cutoff census date to enhance institutional returns. Population panel data from the Higher Educational Statistical Agency (HESA) for 2004/05 to 2019/20 is used to consider the extent to which the numbers of 'starters', 'movers' and 'exits' specifically responded to the RAE/REF cycle. Confining the analysis to full professors, a random effects (RE) multinomial logit model was estimated that shows, after taking account of the importance of other covariates, strong evidence of a 2008 and (in particular) 2014 cycle, but no evidence of any upturn in overall hires (or declines in exiting) in the period preceding the 2021 REF census date. Institutional 'gaming' therefore seems to have been absent during the most recent REF. JEL classification I23; D22; J23; J78.

Citation

Harris, R., Mate-Sanchez-Val, M., & Marín, M. R. (online). Institutional 'gaming' involving staff turnover during recent research evaluation exercises by UK Russell Group universities. Oxford Economic Papers, https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpae032

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Aug 8, 2024
• Online Publication Date: Aug 22, 2024
• Deposit Date: Aug 12, 2024
• Publicly Available Date: Aug 30, 2024
• Journal: Oxford Economic Papers
• Print ISSN: 0030-7653
• Electronic ISSN: 1464-3812
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpae032
• Keywords: Research assessment exercises; academic hiring; UK universities
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2752141