Aristotle’s Alternative to Enduring and Perduring:Lasting

Pemberton, John M.

Abstract

Although Aristotle does not explicitly address persistence, his account of persisting may be derived from a careful consideration of his account of change. On my interpretation, he supposes that motions are mereological unities of their potential temporal parts – I dub such mereological unities ‘lasting’. Aristotle’s persisting things, too, are lasting, I argue. Lasting things are unlike enduring things in that they have temporal parts; and unlike perduring things in that their temporal parts are not actual, but rather are potential. Lasting, that is Aristotle’s persisting, is thus a distinctive alternative to enduring and perduring. I assess this alternative showing it to be attractive.

Citation

Pemberton, J. M. (2022). Aristotle’s Alternative to Enduring and Perduring:Lasting. Ancient Philosophy Today: Dialogoi, 4(2), 217-236. https://doi.org/10.3366/anph.2022.0069

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Sep 1, 2022
• Online Publication Date: Sep 30, 2022
• Publication Date: 2022-10
• Deposit Date: Sep 26, 2024
• Journal: Ancient Philosophy Today
• Print ISSN: 2516-1156
• Electronic ISSN: 2516-1164
• Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 4
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 217-236
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.3366/anph.2022.0069
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2486837