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Information Manipulation in Election Campaigns

Aköz, Kemal Kivanç; Arbatli, Cemal Eren

Authors

Kemal Kivanç Aköz



Abstract

We provide a game-theoretical model of manipulative election campaigns with two political candidates and a Bayesian voter. The latter is uncertain about how good the candidates are. Candidates take unobservable, costly actions to manipulate voter's opinion about their positions. We show that if the candidates differ in campaigning efficiency, and the voter receives the biased campaign messages with some noise, then the cost-efficient candidate can win the election with higher probability than her opponent even when she is ex-post an inferior choice for the voter. Our paper offers a novel informational justification for imposing limits on campaign spending and encouraging diversity in the supply of political information.

Citation

Aköz, K. K., & Arbatli, C. E. (2016). Information Manipulation in Election Campaigns. Economics and Politics, 28(2), 181-215. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12076

Journal Article Type Article
Online Publication Date Jun 1, 2016
Publication Date 2016-07
Deposit Date Nov 7, 2023
Journal Economics & Politics
Print ISSN 0954-1985
Electronic ISSN 1468-0343
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 28
Issue 2
Pages 181-215
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12076
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1899876