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Manipulation Through Biased Product Reviews*

Aköz, Kemal Kıvanç; Arbatli, Cemal Eren; Celik, Levent

Authors

Kemal Kıvanç Aköz

Levent Celik



Abstract

We study a signal-jamming model of product review manipulation in which rational consumers consult product reviews and price to better estimate a product's quality, and a firm, whose quality is either high or low, chooses its price and how much bias to insert into product reviews. We show that both firm types always exert positive effort to manipulate product reviews, and, depending on the equilibrium price level, one or both of them can increase its sales. When the high-type firm exerts more effort than the low-type, review manipulation benefits consumers by raising [lowering] their demand for the high-quality [low-quality] product.

Citation

Aköz, K. K., Arbatli, C. E., & Celik, L. (2020). Manipulation Through Biased Product Reviews*. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 68(4), 591-639. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12240

Journal Article Type Article
Online Publication Date Feb 10, 2021
Publication Date 2020-12
Deposit Date Nov 7, 2023
Journal The Journal of Industrial Economics
Print ISSN 0022-1821
Electronic ISSN 1467-6451
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 68
Issue 4
Pages 591-639
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12240
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1899854