Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism

Lagziel, David; Lehrer, Ehud

Abstract

We design incentive schemes for portfolio managers that screen low-skill managers: only the best portfolio managers, in terms of expected payoffs, agree to participate in a single-period investment. The results hold in general financial markets, where uninformed investors face managers of different capabilities, and can only observe their one-stage realized returns

Citation

Lagziel, D., & Lehrer, E. (2021). Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism. Economic Theory, 71(2), 483-504. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01264-2

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Apr 2, 2020
• Online Publication Date: Apr 24, 2020
• Publication Date: 2021-03
• Deposit Date: Aug 16, 2023
• Journal: Economic Theory
• Print ISSN: 0938-2259
• Electronic ISSN: 1432-0479
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 71
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 483-504
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01264-2
• Keywords: Economics and Econometrics
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1719724