Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity

Cowie, Christopher; Greenberg, Alexander

Abstract

According to constitutivists about epistemic normativity, epistemic normativity is explained by the nature of belief. Specifically, it is explained by the fact that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, belief stands in a normative relation to truth. We ask whether there are persuasive arguments for the claim that belief stands in such a relation to truth. We examine and critique two arguments for this claim. The first is based on the transparency of belief. The second is based on Moore-paradoxical sentences. We develop a common objection to both. Both arguments are reliant on implausible claims about the relation between accepting a norm and being motivated by it. This point has sometimes been made in connection with the transparency of belief. But its development and application to Moore-paradoxical sentences are, we believe, novel.

Citation

Cowie, C., & Greenberg, A. (2018). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In C. Kyriacou, & R. McKenna (Eds.), Metaepistemology : realism and anti-realism (173-196). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_8

• Online Publication Date: Sep 20, 2018
• Publication Date: Sep 20, 2018
• Deposit Date: Feb 18, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Sep 20, 2020
• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Pages: 173-196
• Series Title: Palgrave innovations in Philosophy
• Book Title: Metaepistemology : realism and anti-realism.
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_8
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1660192