Stereotypes, Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Dispositions

Puddifoot, Katherine

Abstract

People sometimes face an epistemic dilemma with regards to stereotyping. We harbor a stereotype that reflects something of social reality, e.g., high rates of criminal involvement among members of a certain social group. But if we apply the stereotype when making judgments about individuals, we make certain mistakes, e.g., failing to notice positive characteristics of those negatively stereotyped. The dilemma that we face is as follows: if we do not stereotype, they make an epistemic error—failing to reflect the social reality in our judgment—but if we engage in stereotyping, we are susceptible to further epistemic errors in the form of mistaken judgments about individuals. This chapter argues that cases like these demonstrate the value of focusing on the dispositions of believers when making epistemic evaluations. By focusing on the full dispositional profile associated with believing a stereotype—that is, the dispositions implicated in the formation of the stereotyping belief and the dispositions possessed as a result of possessing the belief—it is possible to achieve what many other approaches to epistemic value fail to achieve: adequately capturing the epistemic dilemma we face with regard to stereotyping.

Citation

Puddifoot, K. (2021). Stereotypes, Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Dispositions. In K. McCain, S. Stapleford, & M. P. Steup (Eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003134565

• Online Publication Date: Oct 22, 2021
• Publication Date: 2021
• Deposit Date: Feb 8, 2021
• Publicly Available Date: Apr 22, 2023
• Publisher: Routledge
• Edition: 1st Edition
• Book Title: Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles
• ISBN: 9780367681425
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003134565
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1626080
• Contract Date: Feb 8, 2021