Epistemic Injustice and Implicit Bias

Holroyd, Jules; Puddifoot, Katherine

Abstract

Because our knowledge-generating abilities are connected to our moral worth, we can wrong other people by treating them in ways that are disrespectful of their knowledge-generating abilities or place unjust epistemic burdens on them. Such wrongs are called “epistemic injustices.” Chapter 6 examines the ways in which implicit biases have been implicated in a range of epistemic injustices, including testimonial injustice, epistemic appropriation, and epistemic exploitation.

Citation

Holroyd, J., & Puddifoot, K. (2020). Epistemic Injustice and Implicit Bias. In E. Beeghly, & A. Madva (Eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice and the Social Mind. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315107615

• Online Publication Date: Apr 9, 2020
• Publication Date: 2020
• Deposit Date: Feb 8, 2021
• Publicly Available Date: Aug 11, 2022
• Publisher: Routledge
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Book Title: An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice and the Social Mind
• Chapter Number: 6
• ISBN: 9781138092235
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315107615
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1625957