Hylomorphic Unity

Marmodoro, A

Abstract

One of the greatest metaphysical insights that Aristotle contributed to the history of philosophy is that objects may be partitioned in two ways: into parts and into abstracta. The latter kind of division has not received due attention among contemporary extensional mereologists (who advocate division into parts only), and even in neo-Aristotelian quarters. In addition to clarifying which type of part is relevant for understanding Aristotle’s hylomorphism, I urge that we need to critically re-examine certain assumptions we make in our study of Aristotle’s theory of substance. Among the questions I raise in this chapter are these: Is there a primary matter-to-form ‘relation’ in a substance? Is the ‘relation’ between matter and form in a substance analogous to that of potentiality to actuality? Does Aristotle’s theory of substance deliver a sound account of substantial unity? I will argue that it doesn’t, and supply an account, which derives from principles within Aristotle’s metaphysics, but differs from the account given to us by Aristotle. I will argue that Aristotle came very close to having a full account of the oneness of a substance, but fell short of it. He unified matter and form in a substance definitionally, but did not explain and justify the oneness of the definition.

Citation

Marmodoro, A. (2020). Hylomorphic Unity. In R. Bliss, & J. Miller (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics (284-299). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315112596

• Online Publication Date: Jul 14, 2020
• Publication Date: 2020
• Deposit Date: Oct 5, 2022
• Publisher: Routledge
• Pages: 284-299
• Book Title: The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315112596
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1620770