Conditions for the acceptance of deontic conditionals

Over, DE; Manktelow, KI; Hadjichristidis, C

Abstract

Recent psychological research has investigated how people assess the probability of an indicative conditional. Most people give the conditional probability of q given p as the probability of if p then q. Asking about the probability of an indicative conditional, one is in effect asking about its acceptability. But on what basis are deontic conditionals judged to be acceptable or unacceptable? Using a decision theoretic analysis, we argue that a deontic conditional, of,the form if p then must q or if p then may q, will be judged acceptable to the extent that the p R q possibility is preferred to the p R not-q possibility. Two experiments are reported in which this prediction was upheld. There was also evidence that the pragmatic suitability of permission rules is partly determined by evaluations of the not-p R q possibility. Implications of these results for theories of deontic reasoning are discussed.

Citation

Over, D., Manktelow, K., & Hadjichristidis, C. (2004). Conditions for the acceptance of deontic conditionals. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58(2), 96-105

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: 2004-06
• Journal: Canadian Journal Of Experimental Psychology-revue Canadienne De; Psychologie Experimentale
• Print ISSN: 1196-1961
• Electronic ISSN: 1878-7290
• Publisher: American Psychological Association
• Volume: 58
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 96-105
• Keywords: SELECTION TASK; PROBABILITIES; INFERENCE; UTILITIES
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1574413