Scottish Commonsense About Memory: A Defence of Thomas Reid's Direct Knowledge Account

Hamilton, Andy

Abstract

Reid rejects the image theory --the representative or indirect realist position--that memory-judgements are inferred from or otherwise justified by a present image or introspectible state. He also rejects the trace theory , which regards memories as essentially traces in the brain. In contrast he argues for a direct knowledge account in which personal memory yields unmediated knowledge of the past. He asserts the reliability of memory, not in currently fashionable terms as a reliable belief-forming process, but more elusively as a principle of Commonsense. There remains a contemporary consensus against Reid's position. I argue that Reid's critique is essentially sound, and that the consensus is mistaken; personal memory judgements are spontaneous and non-inferential in the same way as perceptual judgements. But I question Reid's account of the connection between personal memory and personal identity. My primary concern is rationally reconstructive rather than scholarly, and downplays recent interpretations of Reid's faculty psychology as a precursor of functionalism and other scientific philosophies of mind.

Citation

Hamilton, A. (2003). Scottish Commonsense About Memory: A Defence of Thomas Reid's Direct Knowledge Account. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(2), 229-245. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajp/jag206

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: 2003-06
• Deposit Date: Mar 25, 2008
• Journal: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 0004-8402
• Electronic ISSN: 1471-6828
• Publisher: Taylor and Francis Group
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 81
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 229-245
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ajp/jag206
• Publisher URL: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a713659634~db=all~order=page