The Foundational Role of the Principal of Instrumental Reason in Gewirth’s Argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency: A Response to Andrew Chitty.

Beyleveld, Deryck; Bos, Gerhard

Abstract

The legal idealism associated with the 'Sheffield School' rests on Gewirth's argument for the dialectical necessity of the 'PGC,' in which an interim derivation is the dialectically necessity for agents to claim the 'generic rights' for themselves. Andrew Chitty has recently contended that this interim derivation is essentially deliberator-relative on prudential grounds, which prevents it being dialectically necessary for agents to grant the generic rights to others. In response, we argue that agents need only consider that they have the generic rights on prudential grounds because it is dialectically necessary for them to reason instrumentally. The epistemological priority of logical/analytic considerations over prudential ones renders it dialectically necessary for agents to grant the generic rights to others independently of any prudential considerations though not of deliberator-relative ones. We also briefly examine and qualify Chitty's analysis of the implications for legal idealism of alternative dialectically contingent arguments for the PGC.

Citation

Beyleveld, D., & Bos, G. (2009). The Foundational Role of the Principal of Instrumental Reason in Gewirth’s Argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency: A Response to Andrew Chitty. King's Law Journal, 20(1), 1-20

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: 2009-02
• Deposit Date: Nov 1, 2010
• Journal: King’s Law Journal.
• Print ISSN: 0961-5768
• Electronic ISSN: 1757-8442
• Publisher: Dickson Poon School of Law
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 20
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 1-20
• Keywords: Legal idealism, Sheffield school, PGC, Principle of instrumental reason, Gewirth
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1514541
• Publisher URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/klj/2009/00000020/00000001/art00001