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Hide and seek in Arizona.

Rosenthal, R.W.; Shachat, J.; Walker, M.

Authors

R.W. Rosenthal

M. Walker



Abstract

Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of “hide and seek”. Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player’s role in the game; an asymmetry across the game variations; and positive serial correlation in subjects’ play. Possible explanations for these departures are considered.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2003-12
Deposit Date Sep 17, 2014
Journal International Journal of Game Theory
Print ISSN 0020-7276
Electronic ISSN 1432-1270
Publisher Springer
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 32
Issue 2
Pages 273-293
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300159
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1453967