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Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply—Experimental Evidence

Damianov, D.S.; Oechssler, J.; Becker, J.G.


J. Oechssler

J.G. Becker


In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many customers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Furthermore, again as predicted by theory, the uniform price auction yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it also the more efficient auction format.


Damianov, D., Oechssler, J., & Becker, J. (2010). Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply—Experimental Evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1), 60-76.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2010-01
Deposit Date Aug 27, 2013
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Print ISSN 0899-8256
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 68
Issue 1
Pages 60-76
Public URL