The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization

Gibb, S.C.

Abstract

Proponents of the subset account of property realization commonly make the assumption that the summing of properties entails the summing of their forward-looking causal features. This paper seeks to establish that this assumption is false. Moreover, it aims to demonstrate that without this assumption the fact that the subset account captures an entailment relation—which it must if it is to be of any use to non-reductive physicalism—becomes questionable.

Citation

Gibb, S. (2014). The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92(3), 551-566. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.857701

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jan 1, 2013
• Online Publication Date: Nov 28, 2013
• Publication Date: 2014
• Deposit Date: Oct 17, 2013
• Publicly Available Date: May 28, 2015
• Journal: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 0004-8402
• Electronic ISSN: 1471-6828
• Publisher: Taylor and Francis Group
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 92
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 551-566
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.857701
• Keywords: Non\-reductive physicalism, Property realization, the subset account, Entailment.
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1448449