Subjective bayesian beliefs

Antoniou, C.; Harrison, G.W.; Lau, M.I.; Read, D.

Abstract

A large literature suggests that many individuals do not apply Bayes’ Rule when making decisions that depend on them correctly pooling prior information and sample data. We replicate and extend a classic experimental study of Bayesian updating from psychology, employing the methods of experimental economics, with careful controls for the confounding effects of risk aversion. Our results show that risk aversion significantly alters inferences on deviations from Bayes’ Rule.

Citation

Antoniou, C., Harrison, G., Lau, M., & Read, D. (2015). Subjective bayesian beliefs. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 50(1), 35-54. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-015-9208-5

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Feb 21, 2015
• Publication Date: Feb 21, 2015
• Deposit Date: Jun 4, 2014
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 18, 2014
• Journal: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
• Print ISSN: 0895-5646
• Electronic ISSN: 1573-0476
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 50
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 35-54
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-015-9208-5
• Keywords: Bayes’ Rule, Subjective beliefs, Learning, D03, D81, D83.
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1425956