Legislator dissent as a valence signal

Campbell, Rosie; Cowley, Phil; Vivyan, Nick; Markus, Wagner

Abstract

Existing research suggests that voters tend to respond positively to legislator independence due to two types of mechanism. First, dissent has an indirect effect, increasing a legislator’s media coverage and personal recognition among constituents (profile effects). Secondly, constituents react positively to dissent when this signals that the legislator has matching political or representational preferences (conditional evaluation). This article presents a third effect: dissent acts as a valence signal of integrity and trustworthiness. Consistent with the valence signalling mechanism, it uses new observational and experimental evidence to show that British voters have a strong and largely unconditional preference for legislators who dissent. The findings pose a dilemma for political systems that rely on strong and cohesive parties.

Citation

Campbell, R., Cowley, P., Vivyan, N., & Markus, W. (2019). Legislator dissent as a valence signal. British Journal of Political Science, 49(1), 105-128. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123416000223

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Feb 1, 2016
• Online Publication Date: Jun 24, 2016
• Publication Date: Jan 31, 2019
• Deposit Date: Feb 1, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: Apr 18, 2016
• Journal: British Journal of Political Science
• Print ISSN: 0007-1234
• Electronic ISSN: 1469-2112
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 49
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 105-128
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123416000223
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1421402