Give peace a chance: The effect of ownership and asymmetric information on peace.

Corchón, Luis C.; Yildizparlak, Anil

Abstract

We study the possibility of peace when two countries fight a war over the ownership of a resource. War is always the outcome of the game played by rational countries – under complete or asymmetric information – when there is no pre-established distribution of the resource among countries. When there is such a distribution of the resource, under complete information peace is feasible for some initial distributions of the resource, whereas under asymmetric information there are two classes of equilibria: Peaceful Equilibria, in which peace has a positive probability, and Aggressive Equilibria, which assign probability one to war. Surprisingly, a little asymmetric information may yield war.

Citation

Corchón, L. C., & Yildizparlak, A. (2013). Give peace a chance: The effect of ownership and asymmetric information on peace. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 92, 116-126. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.05.013

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 24, 2013
• Online Publication Date: Jun 5, 2013
• Publication Date: 2013-08
• Deposit Date: Sep 29, 2014
• Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
• Print ISSN: 0167-2681
• Electronic ISSN: 2328-7616
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 92
• Pages: 116-126
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.05.013
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1420466