VIII—Defending Dualism

Gibb, S.C.

Abstract

In the contemporary mental causation debate, two dualist models of psychophysical causal relevance have been proposed which entail that although mental events are causally relevant in the physical domain, this is not in virtue of them causing any physical event. It is widely assumed that the principle of the causal completeness of the physical domain provides a general argument against interactive dualism. But, whether the completeness principle presents a problem for these alternative forms of interactive dualism is questionable. In this paper, focusing on the popular no-gap argument for the completeness principle, I explore one reason why.

Citation

Gibb, S. (2015). VIII—Defending Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 115(2pt2), 131-146. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00388.x

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Nov 19, 2015
• Publication Date: Jul 1, 2015
• Deposit Date: Nov 27, 2014
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 1, 2017
• Journal: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
• Print ISSN: 0066-7374
• Electronic ISSN: 1467-9264
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 115
• Issue: 2pt2
• Pages: 131-146
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00388.x
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1419202