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Physical Determinability

Gibb, S.C.

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Abstract

I defend a dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance, according to which mental events are not causes in the physical domain, but are causally relevant in this domain because they enable — or, in other words, provide the appropriate structure for — physical events to be caused. More specifically, I defend the claim that mental events are ‘double preventers’ within the physical domain, where double preventers are a type of enabling event. The distinction that I make between causes and enabling events and the dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance that I defend has emerged from my acceptance of the powers theory of causation. In this paper, I explore how this dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance offers a response to Papineau’s defence of the causal completeness principle via the conservation laws.

Citation

Gibb, S. (2015). Physical Determinability. Humana.mente, 29, 69-90

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Dec 1, 2015
Deposit Date Jan 22, 2015
Publicly Available Date Jun 5, 2015
Journal Humana.mente : journal of philosophical studies.
Electronic ISSN 1972-1293
Publisher Department of Philosophy, University of Florence
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 29
Pages 69-90
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1416462
Publisher URL http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/55

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