Physical Determinability

Gibb, S.C.

Abstract

I defend a dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance, according to which mental events are not causes in the physical domain, but are causally relevant in this domain because they enable — or, in other words, provide the appropriate structure for — physical events to be caused. More specifically, I defend the claim that mental events are ‘double preventers’ within the physical domain, where double preventers are a type of enabling event. The distinction that I make between causes and enabling events and the dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance that I defend has emerged from my acceptance of the powers theory of causation. In this paper, I explore how this dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance offers a response to Papineau’s defence of the causal completeness principle via the conservation laws.

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Dec 1, 2015
• Deposit Date: Jan 22, 2015
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 5, 2015
• Journal: Humana.mente : journal of philosophical studies.
• Publisher: Department of Philosophy, University of Florence
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 29
• Pages: 69-90
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1416462
• Publisher URL: http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/55