Professor Matthew Tugby matthew.tugby@durham.ac.uk
Professor
Universals, Laws, and Governance
Tugby, M.
Authors
Abstract
Proponents of the dispositional theory of properties typically claim that their view is not one that offers a realist, governing conception of laws. My first aim is to show that, contrary to this claim, if one commits to dispositionalism then one does not automatically give up on a robust, realist theory of laws. This is because dispositionalism can readily be developed within a Platonic framework of universals. Second, I argue that there are good reasons for realist dispositionalists to favour a Platonic view. This is because the alternative Aristotelian version of dispositionalism, on which universals are immanent entities, is unstable for various reasons. My final aim is to address a common criticism facing Platonic theories of laws, which is the problem of how external entities can play an explanatory role where the world’s law-like patterns of behaviour are concerned. I argue that the Platonists’ response to the one over many problem can help to shed light on this matter, and a possible solution is sketched, one which makes use of the notions of essence, constitution and ontological dependence.
Citation
Tugby, M. (2015). Universals, Laws, and Governance. Philosophical Studies, 173(5), 1147-1163. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0521-2
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Jul 26, 2015 |
Online Publication Date | Jul 26, 2015 |
Publication Date | May 1, 2015 |
Deposit Date | Jul 30, 2015 |
Publicly Available Date | Jul 26, 2016 |
Journal | Philosophical studies |
Print ISSN | 0031-8116 |
Electronic ISSN | 1573-0883 |
Publisher | Springer |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 173 |
Issue | 5 |
Pages | 1147-1163 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0521-2 |
Keywords | Laws, Dispositions, Universals, Platonism, Aristotelianism, Explanation. |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1402063 |
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Copyright Statement
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0521-2
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