Causation: One Word, Many Things

Cartwright, N

Abstract

We currently have on offer a variety of different theories of causation. Many are strikingly good, providing detailed and plausible treatments of exemplary cases; and all suffer from clear counterexamples. I argue that, contra Hume and Kant, this is because causation is not a single, monolithic concept. There are different kinds of causal relations imbedded in different kinds of systems, readily described using thick causal concepts. Our causal theories pick out important and useful structures that fit some familiar cases—cases we discover and ones we devise to fit.

Citation

Cartwright, N. (2004). Causation: One Word, Many Things. Philosophy of Science, 71(5), 805-819. https://doi.org/10.1086/426771

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Jan 1, 2022
• Publication Date: 2004-12
• Deposit Date: Sep 22, 2015
• Journal: Philosophy of Science
• Print ISSN: 0031-8248
• Electronic ISSN: 1539-767X
• Publisher: Philosophy of Science Association
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 71
• Issue: 5
• Pages: 805-819
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/426771
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1399555