Professor Stephen Mumford stephen.mumford@durham.ac.uk
Professor
A new argument against compatibilism
Mumford, Stephen; Anjum, Rani Lill
Authors
Rani Lill Anjum
Abstract
If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced: 1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated 2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers 3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false.
Citation
Mumford, S., & Anjum, R. L. (2014). A new argument against compatibilism. Analysis, 74(1), 20-25. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant095
| Journal Article Type | Article |
|---|---|
| Online Publication Date | Dec 12, 2013 |
| Publication Date | 2014-01 |
| Deposit Date | Aug 14, 2017 |
| Journal | Analysis |
| Print ISSN | 0003-2638 |
| Electronic ISSN | 1467-8284 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
| Volume | 74 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 20-25 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant095 |
| Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1379318 |
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