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Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solution

Anbarci, N.



Given a finite set of alternatives, players alternate making offers. Player 1 offers some alternative that 2 can accept or veto. If 2 accepts, it is enforced, and the game ends. Otherwise, 2 makes a counteroffer among the remaining alternatives, and so on. If all alternatives are vetoed, a disagreement alternative is enforced. First, we characterize the unique outcome of any subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. Then, we show that this outcome converges to the Area Monotonie Solution if the alternatives are uniformly distributed over the bargaining set, and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity.


Anbarci, N. (1993). Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solution. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(1), 245-258.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 1993-02
Deposit Date Aug 17, 2018
Journal The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Print ISSN 0033-5533
Electronic ISSN 1531-4650
Publisher Oxford University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 108
Issue 1
Pages 245-258
Public URL