Non-dictatorial, Pareto-monotonic, cooperative bargaining

Bigelow, J.P.; Anbarci, N.

Abstract

The only solutions to Nash's (1950) cooperative bargaining problem which are Pareto-monotonic, weakly Pareto-optimal, independent of equivalent utility representations, and individually rational are dictatorial solutions which maximize one agent's utility subject to individual rationality for the other.

Citation

Bigelow, J., & Anbarci, N. (1993). Non-dictatorial, Pareto-monotonic, cooperative bargaining. European Journal of Political Economy, 9(4), 551-558. https://doi.org/10.1016/0176-2680%2893%2990039-w

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: 1993-11
• Deposit Date: Aug 17, 2018
• Journal: European Journal of Political Economy
• Print ISSN: 0176-2680
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 9
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 551-558
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0176-2680%2893%2990039-w
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1351440