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The kalai/smorodinsky solution with time preferences

Anbarci, N.



Even under complete information, the Rubinstein scheme does not generate a unique (subgame) perfect equilibrium partition unless the players are risk neutral. In the standard cooperative bargaining literature, on the other hand, time preferences of players do not play any role. It is assumed that players negotiate as long as they want to without foregoing any portion of the pie. The discount factors are not used, even when they are available; this amounts to limiting the available information use in the bargaining problem. By characterizing a modified Kalai/Smorodinsky solution axiomatically the above problems have been tried to be solved.


Anbarci, N. (1989). The kalai/smorodinsky solution with time preferences. Economics Letters, 31(1), 5-7.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 1989-01
Deposit Date Aug 17, 2018
Journal Economics Letters
Print ISSN 0165-1765
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 31
Issue 1
Pages 5-7
Public URL