The kalai/smorodinsky solution with time preferences

Anbarci, N.

Abstract

Even under complete information, the Rubinstein scheme does not generate a unique (subgame) perfect equilibrium partition unless the players are risk neutral. In the standard cooperative bargaining literature, on the other hand, time preferences of players do not play any role. It is assumed that players negotiate as long as they want to without foregoing any portion of the pie. The discount factors are not used, even when they are available; this amounts to limiting the available information use in the bargaining problem. By characterizing a modified Kalai/Smorodinsky solution axiomatically the above problems have been tried to be solved.

Citation

Anbarci, N. (1989). The kalai/smorodinsky solution with time preferences. Economics Letters, 31(1), 5-7. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765%2889%2990102-x

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: 1989-01
• Deposit Date: Aug 17, 2018
• Journal: Economics Letters
• Print ISSN: 0165-1765
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 31
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 5-7
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765%2889%2990102-x
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1351430