A New Explanatory Challenge for Nonnaturalists

Cowie, Christopher

Abstract

According to some contemporary nonnaturalists about normativity (e.g., Parfit, Scanlon, Dworkin), normative facts exist in an ontologically non-committing sense. These nonnaturalists face an explanatory burden. They must explain their claim that normative facts exist in such a sense. I identify criteria for an adequate explanation, and extract five distinct candidate explanations from the writings of these authors (based on causal efficacy, analogy with modality, fundamentality, domain-relativity and first-order considerations respectively). I assess each. None is both (a) informative and (b) recognizable as a version of contemporary nonnaturalism. In light of this, I assess the best options for proponents of this view.

Citation

Cowie, C. (2014). A New Explanatory Challenge for Nonnaturalists. Res Philosophica, 91(4), 661-679. https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2014.91.4.3

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Oct 1, 2014
• Publication Date: 2014-10
• Deposit Date: Sep 6, 2017
• Journal: Res Philosophica
• Print ISSN: 2168-9105
• Electronic ISSN: 2168-9113
• Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 91
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 661-679
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2014.91.4.3
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1349837