Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies

Cowie, Christopher

Abstract

Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a ‘companion’ and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support relations or they are not. If they are not, then the companions in guilt argument fails. If they are, then a reduction of epistemic reasons to evidential support relations becomes available and, consequently, epistemic reasons cease to be a viable ‘companion’ for moral reasons. I recommend this structure of argument over existing strategies within the literature and defend my claims against recent objections from companions in guilt theorists.

Citation

Cowie, C. (2016). Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(1), 115-130. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2015.1026269

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Mar 24, 2015
• Publication Date: 2016
• Deposit Date: Sep 6, 2017
• Publicly Available Date: Aug 25, 2020
• Journal: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 0004-8402
• Electronic ISSN: 1471-6828
• Publisher: Taylor and Francis Group
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 94
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 115-130
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2015.1026269
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1345689