On the optimality of not allocating

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio

Abstract

We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.

Citation

Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Michelucci, F. (2014). On the optimality of not allocating. Economics Letters, 125(2), 233-235. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Sep 12, 2014
• Online Publication Date: Sep 19, 2014
• Publication Date: Nov 1, 2014
• Deposit Date: Jun 15, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 28, 2018
• Journal: Economics Letters
• Print ISSN: 0165-1765
• Electronic ISSN: 1873-7374
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 125
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 233-235
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1328858