Successful uninformed bidding

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel

Abstract

This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multi-unit auctions in which some bidders have more information than others. We show that in a generalized second price auction with single-unit demand, bidders with less information do surprisingly well: they can have a greater probability of winning than bidders with more information do, and may even have a higher expected utility. We also find a positive relationship between the success of less-informed bidders and a ratio of units for sale to bidders.

Citation

Hernando-Veciana, Á. (2004). Successful uninformed bidding. Games and Economic Behavior, 48(1), 29-53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.002

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Nov 18, 2003
• Publication Date: Jul 1, 2004
• Deposit Date: Jun 15, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 28, 2018
• Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
• Print ISSN: 0899-8256
• Electronic ISSN: 1090-2473
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 48
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 29-53
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.002
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1328827