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Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: A simple Nash program

Anbarci, N.; Sun, C.

Authors

C. Sun



Abstract

This article proposes a simple Nash program. Both our axiomatic characterization and our noncooperative procedure consider each distinct asymmetric and symmetric Nash solution. Our noncooperative procedure is a generalization of the simplest known sequential Nash demand game analyzed by Rubinstein et al. (1992). We then provide the simplest known axiomatic characterization of the class of asymmetric Nash solutions, in which we use only Nash’s crucial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom and an asymmetric modification of the well-known Midpoint Domination axiom.

Citation

Anbarci, N., & Sun, C. (2013). Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: A simple Nash program. Economics Letters, 120(2), 211-214. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.026

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Apr 11, 2013
Online Publication Date Apr 18, 2013
Publication Date 2013-08
Deposit Date Aug 17, 2018
Journal Economics Letters
Print ISSN 0165-1765
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 120
Issue 2
Pages 211-214
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.026
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1323004