Professor Nejat Anbarci nejat.anbarci@durham.ac.uk
Professor
Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: A simple Nash program
Anbarci, N.; Sun, C.
Authors
C. Sun
Abstract
This article proposes a simple Nash program. Both our axiomatic characterization and our noncooperative procedure consider each distinct asymmetric and symmetric Nash solution. Our noncooperative procedure is a generalization of the simplest known sequential Nash demand game analyzed by Rubinstein et al. (1992). We then provide the simplest known axiomatic characterization of the class of asymmetric Nash solutions, in which we use only Nash’s crucial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom and an asymmetric modification of the well-known Midpoint Domination axiom.
Citation
Anbarci, N., & Sun, C. (2013). Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: A simple Nash program. Economics Letters, 120(2), 211-214. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.026
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Apr 11, 2013 |
Online Publication Date | Apr 18, 2013 |
Publication Date | 2013-08 |
Deposit Date | Aug 17, 2018 |
Journal | Economics Letters |
Print ISSN | 0165-1765 |
Electronic ISSN | 1873-7374 |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 120 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 211-214 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.026 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1323004 |
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