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A meta-allocation mechanism in cooperative bargaining

Anbarci, N.; Yi, G.

Authors

G. Yi



Abstract

We analyze an iterative meta-allocation mechanism, the Minimal Agreement Procedure, which can be used to resolve bargaining conflicts generated by players' proposal of differing solution concepts in two-person cooperative bargaining. At each stage of the iteration, our procedure improves the disagreement point so that its limit is on the Pareto frontier.

Citation

Anbarci, N., & Yi, G. (1992). A meta-allocation mechanism in cooperative bargaining. Economics Letters, 38(2), 175-179. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765%2892%2990050-9

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 1992-02
Deposit Date Aug 17, 2018
Journal Economics Letters
Print ISSN 0165-1765
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 38
Issue 2
Pages 175-179
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765%2892%2990050-9
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1322810