Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution.

Anbarci, N.; Sun, C.

Abstract

We propose a new axiom, weakest collective rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both weak Pareto optimality (WPO) in Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) original characterization and strong individual rationality (SIR) in Roth’s (Math Oper Res 2:64–65, 1977) characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the Nash solution by symmetry (SYM), scale invariance (SI), independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and our weakest collective rationality (WCR) axiom.

Citation

Anbarci, N., & Sun, C. (2011). Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution. Social Choice and Welfare, 37(3), 425-429. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0497-y

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Aug 14, 2010
• Online Publication Date: Sep 7, 2010
• Publication Date: 2011-09
• Deposit Date: Aug 17, 2018
• Journal: Social Choice and Welfare
• Print ISSN: 0176-1714
• Electronic ISSN: 1432-217X
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 37
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 425-429
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0497-y
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1322702