The area monotonic solution to the cooperative bargaining problem

Anbarci, N.; Bigelow, J.P.

Abstract

A new solution is proposed to Nash's cooperative bargaining problem. Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom is replaced with a new axiom, area monotonicity (AM). The unique solution satisfying AM, symmetry, weak Pareto optimality, and independence of equivalent utility representations is characterized. It is the utility allocation at the intersection of the Pareto frontier and the line which departs from the disagreement point and divides the utility possibility set in half. Alternatively, the solution is characterized by strong Pareto optimality and AM.

Citation

Anbarci, N., & Bigelow, J. (1994). The area monotonic solution to the cooperative bargaining problem. Mathematical Social Sciences, 28(2), 133-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896%2893%2900746-h

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: 1994-10
• Deposit Date: Aug 17, 2018
• Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences
• Print ISSN: 0165-4896
• Electronic ISSN: 1879-3118
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 28
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 133-142
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896%2893%2900746-h
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1322576