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The area monotonic solution to the cooperative bargaining problem

Anbarci, N.; Bigelow, J.P.

Authors

J.P. Bigelow



Abstract

A new solution is proposed to Nash's cooperative bargaining problem. Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom is replaced with a new axiom, area monotonicity (AM). The unique solution satisfying AM, symmetry, weak Pareto optimality, and independence of equivalent utility representations is characterized. It is the utility allocation at the intersection of the Pareto frontier and the line which departs from the disagreement point and divides the utility possibility set in half. Alternatively, the solution is characterized by strong Pareto optimality and AM.

Citation

Anbarci, N., & Bigelow, J. (1994). The area monotonic solution to the cooperative bargaining problem. Mathematical Social Sciences, 28(2), 133-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896%2893%2900746-h

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 1994-10
Deposit Date Aug 17, 2018
Journal Mathematical Social Sciences
Print ISSN 0165-4896
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 28
Issue 2
Pages 133-142
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896%2893%2900746-h
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1322576